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I. INTRODUCTION 
In tort law’s march into employment discrimination law, retaliation bears 
recent tracks. While the intersection of torts and the substantive law of status-
based discrimination has attracted the most attention—sparked by the Supreme 
Court’s grab for proximate cause in the closely watched “cat’s paw” 
decision—retaliation is the site of tort law’s most recent intrusion into Title 
VII. So far, as with other areas of employment discrimination law, the 
importation of tort-based concepts into retaliation law has served only to chip 
away at employer liability. This Article explores how tort principles have 
quietly taken root in retaliation law, with an eye toward pushing the tort 
analogy in a different direction to sharpen the focus on employer wrongdoing. 
II. THE “TORT” OF RETALIATION: NASSAR AND TORT-BASED LIMITS ON 
CAUSATION 
Nearly a quarter century has passed since the Supreme Court reached for 
tort principles in a pair of sexual harassment cases to determine employer 
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liability rules under Title VII, drawing on inspiration from torts to impose 
vicarious liability, subject to an affirmative defense imposing a duty on the 
plaintiff to mitigate harm.1 More recently in Staub v. Proctor Hospital,2 the 
Court borrowed proximate cause from tort law to craft employer liability rules 
for adverse actions prompted by subordinate bias (also known as the cat’s paw 
scenario) in an employment discrimination case.3 By comparison, tort 
principles came late to retaliation law, at least overtly. The Supreme Court 
explicitly identified tort law as a source of authority for Title VII retaliation 
claims in its 2013 decision in University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. 
Nassar.4 Nassar presented the issue of whether a retaliation plaintiff could 
proceed on a “motivating-factor” model of causation, similar to Title VII 
plaintiffs challenging status-based discrimination, or whether they must prove 
the higher “but-for” standard of causation.5 
The plaintiff in the case was a doctor, described as a person of Middle 
Eastern descent, who complained about allegedly discriminatory treatment by 
his supervisor.6 Among the evidence suggesting bias, Dr. Nassar pointed to 
disparaging remarks about Middle Easterners by his supervisor.7 Dr. Nassar 
attempted to restructure his employment at the hospital so that he would not 
have to report to this supervisor; in explaining to hospital administrators the 
reason for this request, he described his supervisor as biased.8 According to 
Dr. Nassar, the administrators responded by defending the supervisor and 
punishing him for complaining.9 
Dr. Nassar sued the hospital for national origin discrimination and 
retaliation.10 The district court sent the claims to the jury, which found for the 
plaintiff on both claims.11 The Fifth Circuit overturned the verdict on the 
discrimination claim for insufficient proof, but upheld the verdict on the 
retaliation claim under a mixed-motive framework.12 The hospital challenged 
this ruling in the Supreme Court, arguing that Dr. Nassar should have been 
required to prove but-for causation—that the termination would not have 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998). 
 2 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
 3 Id. at 1194 (interpreting the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act). 
 4 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 5 Id. at 2524. 
 6 Id. at 2523.  
 7 Id.; Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 8 Nassar, 674 F.3d at 451. 
 9 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. (reciting case history and noting jury award of over $400,000 for back pay and 
more than $3,000,000 in compensatory damages, which the district court reduced to 
$300,000). 
 12 Nassar, 674 F.3d at 453–55. 
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occurred but for the hospital’s retaliatory motive.13 In a decision notable for its 
reliance on tort law, the Court sided with the hospital and overturned the 
retaliation verdict, adopting the stricter but-for approach to causation for Title 
VII retaliation claims.14 
Unlike Staub, where the Court borrowed proximate cause from tort law to 
parse causation,15 in Nassar the Court turned to tort law to set limits on 
causation-in-fact.16 In both cases, the Court used tort principles to justify its 
selection of a standard that courts can use to rein in employer liability. In 
Nassar, the Court did so despite having taken a markedly different approach to 
causation-in-fact in an earlier Title VII precedent. In 1989, the Court ruled in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins17 that Title VII’s “because of” language in 
section 703(a) permits plaintiffs to prevail by proving that discrimination was 
a “motivating part” (in the words of the plurality) or a “substantial factor” (in 
the terminology used by the concurring justices), unless the defendant proves 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision 
without considering the discriminatory reason.18 This ruling effectively shifted 
the burden of proof onto the defendant to disprove but-for causation once the 
plaintiff proves a discriminatory motivating (or substantial) factor. 
Two years later, as part of a broader reform of employment discrimination 
law to correct a series of anti-plaintiff judicial rulings, Congress embraced this 
causation standard while making it more plaintiff-friendly in its 
consequences.19 Instead of giving the defendant a defense to liability in the 
same decision, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act) codified the 
defense as a defense to remedies only. Under the 1991 Act, a defendant can 
avoid reinstatement and damages by proving that the plaintiff would have 
suffered the adverse action even absent the discriminatory motivation.20 After 
the 1991 Act, Title VII liability is established by proof that the discriminatory 
reason was a “motivating factor.”21 
                                                                                                                     
 13 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
 14 Id. at 2533. 
 15 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011). 
 16 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524–25. After Staub, lower courts have applied a similar 
proximate cause limit to retaliation cases presenting the cat’s paw scenario, where a biased 
underling causes the adverse action taken by the ultimate decisionmaker. See Smith v. 
Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2012); McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 176–77, 
179 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 17 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 18 Id. at 250 (plurality opinion); id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 19 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)). 
 20 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (2012)). 
 21 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249. The “motivating factor” language corresponds 
to the plurality’s language in Price Waterhouse, rather than Justice O’Connor’s subtly 
different, “substantial factor” standard. Id. at 265. 
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The difficulty the Court confronted in Nassar is one that has repeatedly 
dogged the 1991 Act; in its embrace of a more plaintiff-friendly standard, 
Congress only amended section 703 of Title VII, raising questions about the 
implications for other, related, statutory provisions.22 Both section 703(a), the 
ban on status-based discrimination, and section 704(a), the retaliation 
provision, use the words “because of” to define the unlawful employment 
practice.23 The 1991 Act codified the motivating-factor standard for status-
based discrimination, but said nothing about retaliation specifically. The most 
aggressive reading of the 1991 amendment would interpret Congress’s 
embrace of the motivating-factor model in the new section 703(m) as a gloss 
on other uses of “because of” elsewhere in the statute.24 It was no surprise that 
the Court did not adopt such a robust reading of the 1991 Act,25 but it was 
surprising how far the Court went in the opposite direction.26 The Nassar 
majority not only refused to apply the 1991 Act’s motivating-factor framework 
to section 704(a), it rejected the pre-existing framework that the 1991 Act 
codified (albeit, in a modified, more plaintiff-friendly way), abandoning the 
Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework for section 704(a) claims 
altogether.27 The Court read Congress’s strengthening of the mixed-motive 
model from Price Waterhouse as a wholesale rejection of the mixed-motive 
model for section 704(a), leaving only the most defendant-friendly but-for 
standard to govern such claims.28 The Court’s main support for jettisoning the 
mixed-motive model came not from Title VII precedent, but from tort law.29 
The Court began its interpretation of “because of” in section 704(a) by 
analogizing the Title VII retaliation claim to a tort. The Court explained, 
“[c]ausation in fact . . . is a standard requirement of any tort claim. This 
includes federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination.”30 The Court 
                                                                                                                     
 22 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 538–51 
(2009) (discussing this problem in the 1991 Act). 
 23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 703(a), 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 251–
57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a)) (2012)). 
 24 Widiss, supra note 22, at 550–51. 
 25 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 486 (8th ed. 2013) (noting that most circuit courts applied the Price 
Waterhouse standard, and not the 1991 Act provision amending it, in retaliation claims). 
 26 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (interpreting the 1991 Act’s 
disparate impact provision’s failure to amend the ADEA as leaving in place the Title VII 
Wards Cove decision to govern the parallel disparate impact provision in the ADEA (citing 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989))); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–76 (2009) (interpreting the ADEA to require proof of but-
for causation, but in rejecting the applicability of the Price Waterhouse mixed motive 
framework to the ADEA, noting that Title VII is a “different statute”). 
 27 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525–27, 2534 (2013). 
 28 Id. at 2534. 
 29 Id. at 2524–25. 
 30 Id. (citations omitted). 
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then turned to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which it read to require 
plaintiffs to prove but for causation in order to establish causation-in-fact.31 
This reading of tort principles contrasts sharply with that of Justice O’Connor 
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse.32 She too turned to tort law to 
interpret causation-in-fact under Title VII, but found it to support flipping the 
burden of proof onto the defendant to disprove but for causation once the 
plaintiff proves that the defendant’s wrongdoing was a “substantial factor” 
causing harm.33 
Not being a torts scholar, I will leave it to others to debate which version 
of causation-in-fact best corresponds to tort law.34 Whichever standard tort 
law actually supports, the underlying reasons for the Court’s more restrictive 
reading of torts surfaced later in the Nassar opinion. As it did in Vance v. Ball 
State University,35 a Title VII case decided the same Term as Nassar, the 
Court prioritized ease of administration—a lightly veiled euphemism for 
enabling courts to more easily grant motions for judgment as a matter of law—
and the weeding out of non-meritorious claims.36 Sounding more like a 
common law court than a court engaging in statutory interpretation, the 
majority cited the “central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of 
resources [to] the judicial and litigation systems,” and sounded a cautionary 
note about the uptick in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
charges alleging retaliation.37 
Notably, for the first time, the Court in Nassar suggested a zero-sum 
relationship between retaliation and discrimination claims. The Court warned 
that adopting the more plaintiff-friendly causation standard would promote 
frivolous retaliation claims, at the cost of siphoning away resources from 
efforts to combat discrimination.38 This newfound tension between retaliation 
and discrimination strikes a new tune for the Court, which, in recent years, has 
heralded the symbiotic relationship between the two claims and emphasized 
                                                                                                                     
 31 Id. at 2525. 
 32 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 33 Id. at 263–64. 
 34 Justice Ginsburg, however, makes a persuasive case in her dissent in Nassar that 
tort law does not support the majority’s ruling. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 
S. Ct. 2517, 2546–47 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 35 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
 36 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531–32; Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444. 
 37 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531; see also id. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, 
the Court appears driven by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against 
employers.”). 
 38 Id. at 2531–32 (“[L]essening the causation standard could also contribute to the 
filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employer, 
administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment.”). 
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the need for broad protection from retaliation in order to fulfill the promise of 
anti-discrimination law.39 
This change in tune also reflects changes in the composition of the Court 
and the resulting voting blocks. Justice Kennedy, the author of Nassar, had 
joined Justice Thomas’s dissent in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education,40 the case that launched a series of cases reading broadly-worded 
bans on discrimination to implicitly and by necessity encompass protection 
from retaliation.41 Justice Kennedy also dissented in Price Waterhouse, so he 
has consistently favored but-for causation as the standard for Title VII.42 With 
the substitution of Justice Alito for Justice O’Connor (who was in the majority 
in both Jackson and Price Waterhouse), the stage was set for the justices’ 
alignment in Nassar. 
At bottom, the animating principle underlying the selection of tort 
principles in Nassar is the pull of employment at will and the protection of 
employer autonomy in managing the workplace.43 This concern comes 
through even in the majority’s description of the facts, which paints a different 
picture than the story told by the dissent and the lower courts in the case.44 
                                                                                                                     
 39 See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 239–40 (2009); 
Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
375, 376–78 (2010); Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The 
Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 923–24 (2009). 
 40 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
 41 See id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 
U.S. 442, 451–52 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 
474, 481–82 (2008) (interpreting the federal employee provision of the ADEA); cf. Kasten 
v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1329 (2011) (interpreting 
FLSA retaliation provision to implicitly protect against retaliation for oral complaints, 
despite statutory language making it unlawful to retaliate against an employee who “filed” 
a complaint). 
 42 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 43 See generally MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 99 (2d 
ed. 2010) (stating that every state except Montana follows the employment at will common 
law rule); Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53, 56–57, 93–96 (2007) (summarizing the meaning and history of 
“the American rule” of at-will employment as the common law baseline from which 
statutes craft exceptions). 
 44 Compare Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523–24, 2532 (describing facts in a way that 
suggests the hospital was initially amenable to the plaintiff’s requested restructuring but 
changed its position because of generally applicable rules requiring all affiliated staff 
doctors to be members of the faculty; and raising the specter of a conniving employee who 
brings a specious discrimination complaint in order to manufacture a retaliation claim), 
with id. at 2535–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (detailing the supervisor’s different and more 
demanding treatment of the plaintiff, her comments reflecting bias, and the unfounded 
basis for her criticism of the plaintiff). 
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After reading the majority’s statement of facts, one might forget that the jury 
ruled for the plaintiff on both the national origin and retaliation claims.45 
The Nassar opinion reads more like a tort case than a statutory decision. 
After staging tort law as “the background against which Congress legislated,” 
the majority concluded that Congress intended to incorporate tort law’s 
“default rules” rather than break from them.46 Whether this importation of tort 
law is a positive development or a lamentable one,47 the Court’s explicit 
description of the Title VII retaliation claim as a tort leaves little reason to 
believe that tort law’s influence on retaliation law will end here. Indeed, tort 
analogies may have more staying power in retaliation cases than the rest of 
employment discrimination law. Status-based discrimination claims “map onto 
no obvious tort,”48 but retaliation has a somewhat closer—although 
troubling—analogue in the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy.49 As the discussion below demonstrates, even before the Nassar 
decision, retaliation case law in the lower courts had already been deeply 
affected by principles sounding in torts. 
III. PROTECTED ACTIVITY AND ITS INTERSECTION WITH TORT LAW 
While the Supreme Court’s explicit reliance on tort law to construe Title 
VII’s retaliation provision has so far been limited to causation, the bigger 
influence of torts on retaliation cases in the lower courts, albeit surreptitiously, 
has been to narrow the scope of protected activity.50 As I read the retaliation 
cases in the lower courts, tort concepts sounding in plaintiff fault, employer 
duty, and proximate cause have migrated into Title VII doctrine to limit 
protected activity—the threshold issue in a retaliation claim. 
Two Title VII doctrines in particular limit the scope of protected activity 
in ways that map onto tort principles: the reasonable belief doctrine and the 
newly-minted manager rule. Like the Supreme Court in Nassar, lower courts 
have crafted these limits in response to concerns that the retaliation claim 
                                                                                                                     
 45 Id. at 2536–37 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reciting this history and noting that 
the district court reduced the jury’s compensatory damages award on the discrimination 
claim from over $3 million to $300,000 pursuant to the statutory cap). 
 46 Id. at 2525. 
 47 For arguments criticizing the importation of tort principles into employment 
discrimination statutes, see Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1199, 1232–35 (2013) [hereinafter Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause]; 
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination Statutes]; Charles A. Sullivan, 
Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1432–34 (2012). 
 48 See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1432 n.1 (noting that employment discrimination 
“maps onto no obvious tort” and may be more similar to “a refusal to deal”); see also 
Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 47, at 36–38 (discussing the difficulty of 
“map[ping] employment discrimination claims onto traditional tort[s]”). 
 49 See Slater, supra note 43, at 96–97 (describing the tort). 
 50 See infra pp. 8–17. 
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would otherwise go too far in restricting employer autonomy and intrude too 
deeply into the default regime of at-will employment.51 
Before exploring these doctrines, and by way of background, a cursory 
review of Title VII retaliation law is in order. An essential feature of 
retaliation law is the bifurcation of the claim depending on whether the 
plaintiff complained internally, to someone within the workplace, or 
externally, to a government enforcement agency (the EEOC or a state fair 
employment agency).52 Title VII’s retaliation provision has two separate 
clauses, the opposition clause, which governs internal complaints, and the 
participation clause, which governs external enforcement through the specified 
channels.53 Both avenues are protected, but internal opposition garners less 
protection and is governed by distinctive doctrines circumscribing protected 
activity; conversely, participation in formal enforcement channels earns the 
highest level of protection.54 Given the widespread adoption of internal anti-
discrimination policies and grievance procedures by employers over the past 
few decades, employees rarely take their complaints to outside agencies, at 
least not before trying internal complaint channels first.55 If an external charge 
is filed after an internal complaint, any retaliation occurring before the charge 
was filed falls under the opposition clause rather than the participation 
clause.56 Because of the prominence of internal complaint channels in 
workplaces today, gaps in protection under the opposition clause are especially 
harmful to employees. Both doctrines addressed below, the reasonable belief 
                                                                                                                     
 51 See, e.g., Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto., LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 865, 877–78 (E.D. Mich. 2014); 
Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. TJS–10–1933, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140207, at *4–
5 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013). 
 52 See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that the participation clause applies only to Title VII’s express enforcement 
“machinery,” such as “proceedings and activities” connected with a formal EEOC charge, 
while internal complaints fall under the opposition clause). 
 53 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 247 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)) (making it an “unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice . . . .”) (the opposition clause); id. (making it an unlawful employment practice to 
discriminate against an employee because he or she “has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter”) (the participation clause). 
 54 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 25, at 457–58. 
 55 See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 884–86, 930–31 (2008) (discussing the growth of 
internal complaint procedures and the pressure on employees to use them and not take their 
discrimination complaints directly to external enforcement channels). 
 56 See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003); Booker v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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doctrine and the manager rule, fall under the opposition clause and restrict 
what counts as protected activity under that clause. 
A. The Reasonable Belief Doctrine: Unreasonable Plaintiffs in Tort and 
Retaliation 
One of the most constraining doctrines in Title VII retaliation law is the 
reasonable belief doctrine. While it had some traction in the lower courts 
earlier, this doctrine secured its foothold in the 2000 Supreme Court case of 
Clark County School District v. Breeden.57 Without foreclosing the possibility 
that an even tougher standard might apply, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim under the opposition clause for lack of a reasonable belief that 
the conduct she opposed actually violated Title VII.58 As the Court applied 
this rule, the complaining employee must have an objectively reasonable 
belief, both legally and factually, that the underlying conduct violated Title 
VII in order to be protected from retaliation for an internal complaint.59 The 
doctrine tracks tort law in its use of plaintiff fault, measured by an objective 
reasonableness standard, to limit recovery. 
As numerous critics have noted, the Breeden case is the paradigmatic case 
of bad facts making bad law.60 The plaintiff, a woman, was offended by a 
verbal exchange during a meeting with a male supervisor and a male co-
worker.61 While the three were in a meeting reviewing applicant files, one of 
the men commented on a note in an applicant’s personnel file that he once said 
to a woman, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand 
Canyon.”62 He then turned to the other man in the meeting and said, “I don’t 
know what that means.”63 This man replied, “[w]ell, I’ll tell you later,” and 
both men laughed.64 The plaintiff, who heard the remark and the laughter, was 
offended.65 She complained internally, following the employer’s anti-
                                                                                                                     
 57 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). 
 58 Id. at 271. The Court assumed, without deciding, that this was the governing 
standard, as opposed to requiring the plaintiff to prove that the underlying conduct was 
actually unlawful. 
 59 Id. at 270. 
 60 See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 55, at 915–29; Brianne J. Gorod, 
Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1469, 1471–72 (2007); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation 
Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 
955 (2007); Moberly, supra note 39, at 389 n.71; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not 
to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for 
Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 
1176 (2007). 
 61 Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269–70. 
 62 Id. at 269. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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discrimination policy and complaint procedure.66 The Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim, ruling that the complaint 
was not protected activity because the plaintiff lacked an objectively 
reasonable belief that the comment and laughter met the severe or pervasive 
standard for an actionable hostile environment.67 
The significance of Breeden for retaliation claims arising out of an internal 
complaint is twofold. First, the Court evaluated reasonableness based on the 
case law governing actionable harassment under Title VII.68 Because one 
sexually offensive incident is not enough, as a matter of law, to create a hostile 
environment, the Court ruled, it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to believe 
otherwise.69 The Court’s failure to consider reasonableness from the 
employee’s perspective departs from its approach in assessing the degree of 
adversity required for a retaliatory action, which asks whether it would likely 
deter a reasonable employee in the circumstances of the plaintiff from 
complaining.70 
Second, the Court determined the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
perception based entirely on the governing law, without considering the scope 
of the employer’s sexual harassment policy. In fact, the employer’s policy 
proscribed a wide range of conduct, broadly defining sexual harassment to 
encompass “uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks and questions.”71 The 
Court did not mention that the plaintiff had followed this policy in reporting 
the incident, a fact that the Ninth Circuit had relied on in ruling that, while the 
incident did not violate Title VII, the plaintiff’s belief that it did was 
reasonable.72 
Since Breeden, the reasonable belief doctrine has taken off in the lower 
courts. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts use judicial 
understandings of actionable discrimination to set a ceiling on the 
reasonableness of employee perceptions of discrimination.73 Rather than using 
                                                                                                                     
 66 Id. at 269–70. 
 67 Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71.  
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69–71 (2006) 
(considering that the plaintiff was the only woman in her department, and using the 
example of a single mother with child care responsibilities to show how an employee’s 
circumstances might affect a court’s determination of whether the retaliatory acts would 
likely dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining). 
 71 Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 726, 728 
(9th Cir. 2000) (BNA) (citing the employer’s policy). 
 72 Id. 
 73  See, e.g., Session v. Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Bd., 462 F. App’x 323, 326 (4th Cir. 
2012) (finding that two comments perceived by plaintiff to be subjectively insulting were 
“inadequate as a matter of law” to sustain plaintiff’s retaliation claim); Wilson v. Farley, 
203 F. App’x 239, 247–48 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that plaintiff’s complaint about a 
single remark by a co-worker was not objectively reasonable); Butts v. Ameripath, Inc., 
794 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1292–94 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (suggesting, in dicta, that a one-time 
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the perspective of a reasonable employee or a reasonable layperson, courts use 
their own perspective, informed by case law, to gauge the reasonableness of 
the legal and factual support for the employee’s belief in discrimination.74 As 
one court put it: “A plaintiff may not stand on his ignorance of the substantive 
law to argue that his belief was reasonable.”75 
Lower courts have copied Breeden’s disregard of employer anti-
discrimination policies in judging the employee’s reasonableness. In a recent 
article, I examined numerous cases in which courts have persisted in 
measuring reasonableness by narrow legal interpretations, even when the 
plaintiff’s perspective matches the scope of the employer’s anti-discrimination 
policy.76 This creates a troubling dilemma for employees because employer 
anti-discrimination policies often encompass a broader range of conduct than 
what is prohibited by Title VII.77 Employer anti-harassment policies, for 
example, extend far beyond actionable harassment, often using the term 
harassment interchangeably with incivility and disrespect.78 Far from 
cautioning employees about reporting harassing behavior before it becomes 
severe or pervasive, they encourage and even direct employees to immediately 
report conduct falling within the policy. One model harassment policy posted 
on a major website for legal resources instructs, “If an employee feels that he 
or she has been harassed on the basis of his or her sex, race, national origin, 
ethic [sic] background, or any other legally protected characteristic they 
should immediately report the matter to his or her supervisor.”79 Such broad 
policies shape employees’ understanding of, and response to, workplace 
harassment.80 
                                                                                                                     
exposure to numerous racially insensitive e-mails “most likely” did not support an 
objectively reasonable belief in a hostile work environment); Mitchell v. Barnard Constr. 
Co., No. 08-81087-CIV, 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 661, 664 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009) 
(BNA) (rejecting plaintiff’s retaliation claim because co-worker’s single racist remark did 
not support an objectively reasonable belief in a hostile work environment). 
 74 See cases cited supra note 73. 
 75 Mitchell v. Barnard Constr. Co., No. 08-81087-CIV, 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 661, 
664 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009) (BNA). 
 76 See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 140–43 
(2014) [hereinafter Brake, EEO World]. 
 77 Id. at 143–44, 147–49. 
 78 See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2093–2103 
(2003). 
 79 Sample Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policies, FINDLAW, http://smallbusiness. 
findlaw.com/employment-law-and-human-resources/sample-anti-discrimination-and- 
harassment-policies.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JK38-2LRC; 
see also Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., No. 11-cv-02850-JPM-tmp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125999, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 6, 2013) (reciting employer anti-discrimination and 
harassment policy listing among potential forms of harassment, “language or comments that 
are offensive including hostile, mocking or lewd comments or jokes or intimidation that alters 
an individual’s work efficiency”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80 See FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 200–204 (2009). 
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Employer policies, and their effects on employee perceptions, are not 
limited to harassment. They commonly address other forms of discrimination 
too, and define it more broadly than legal authorities. Blending commitments 
to diversity with promises of non-discrimination, such policies blur the line 
between non-discrimination and affirmative action.81 In the same breath that 
they prohibit discrimination, they proclaim support for diversity and increasing 
the representation of persons from historically underrepresented groups.82 
They also frequently cover classes of persons beyond the categories protected 
by Title VII, for example, including sexual orientation and gender identity in 
promises of fairness and inclusion.83 Such policies play a bigger role than the 
external law in shaping employee perceptions of discrimination.84 No wonder, 
then, that employee perceptions of discrimination often extend beyond actual 
unlawful discrimination. 
The clash between employee understandings of discrimination and the 
law’s narrower, more circumscribed definition has created a doctrinal crisis in 
courts’ application of the reasonable belief doctrine. In a case starkly 
illustrating this conflict in the realm of racial harassment, Jordan v. Alternative 
Resources Corp.,85 the plaintiff, an African-American man, had complained of 
a racially offensive statement made by a white co-worker.86 In the company 
break room, while watching televised coverage of a police capture of two 
African-American suspects in several highly publicized sniper shootings in the 
Washington, D.C. area, a white male employee blurted out, “They should put 
those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the apes 
f—k them.”87 The plaintiff was offended, and in talking with other co-
workers, learned that this same colleague had a history of making racially 
offensive comments at work.88 The plaintiff complained about the co-worker’s 
offensive remark, was terminated, and sued for retaliation.89  
The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim, ruling that the plaintiff did not engage in protected 
activity because one racist comment does not create an actionable hostile 
environment, even combined with knowledge that the same co-worker had 
                                                                                                                     
 81 Id. at 14, 42, 72. 
 82 Id. at 142–44, 148–49. 
 83 Id. at 144, 201; see also Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Economic Motives for 
Adopting LGBT-Related Workplace Policies, WILLIAMS INST., Oct. 2011, at 1, available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Mallory-Sears-Corp-Statements- 
Oct2011.pdf (reporting that 87% of Fortune 500 companies have policies prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and 41% have policies including gender 
identity). 
 84 See DOBBIN, supra note 80, at 7–10. 
 85 Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 86 Id. at 339–40. 
 87 Id. at 336. 
 88 Id. at 337. 
 89 Id. at 336. 
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made similar comments previously.90 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an 
opinion that did not mention the fact that the plaintiff had followed the 
company’s anti-harassment policy directing employees to report conduct they 
perceived as discriminatory.91 Even the dissenting judge mentioned this fact 
more in passing than as a full-blown argument for enlarging the perspective 
used to determine the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief in 
discrimination.92 The district court had mentioned the policy only in the course 
of ruling on the plaintiff’s state law claim for breach of contract, which the 
plaintiff also lost, on the grounds that the policy disclaimed creating any 
enforceable rights that would limit the employer’s discretion to fire an 
employee at will.93 
A decade and a half after Breeden, there is a sizeable and growing number 
of lower court decisions applying the reasonable belief doctrine to deny 
protected activity despite employer policies encouraging the plaintiff’s 
complaint. Courts consistently find an absence of protected activity when the 
plaintiff reports conduct that could potentially—if it continued—add up to a 
hostile environment.94 The fact patterns giving rise to the employee 
complaints in these cases include hostile epithets by co-workers and 
demeaning sexual or racial comments by managers. In one particularly vivid, 
if otherwise unexceptional account, a district court in Alabama boldly 
proclaimed, the manager’s “act of slapping [the plaintiff] on the buttocks in an 
effort to make her comply with his demand [to pick up spilled equipment from 
the floor] is certainly not condoned by this court, however, it was not an act 
which reasonably could be perceived as sexual harassment under Eleventh 
Circuit law.”95 This statement was followed by a string citation of cases with 
parentheticals describing sexually explicit facts that courts had ruled fell short 
of an actionable hostile environment, and no mention of whether the employer 
had a policy prohibiting such conduct.96 
A variation on this line of cases deems complaints of harassment 
unreasonable because the alleged harassment did not involve a protected class 
under Title VII. For example, this problem arises when the court views the 
employee’s internal complaint as involving harassment based on sexual 
                                                                                                                     
 90 Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., No. DKC 2004-1091, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5279, at 
*11–15 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2005). 
 91 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 339–40. 
 92 Id. at 350 (King, J., dissenting). 
 93 Jordan, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5279, at *17–20. The plaintiff also brought and lost 
a state law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for failure to 
sufficiently identify a clear public policy that the employer’s conduct violated. Id. at *15–
16. 
 94 See Brake, EEO World, supra note 76, at 140–43 (collecting cases); Brake & 
Grossman, supra note 55, at 923–28 (same); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 18, 87–88 & n.242 (2005) (same). 
 95 Hill v. Guyoungtech USA, Inc., No. 07-0750-KD-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
69388, at *30 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 2008). 
 96 Id. at *21–27. 
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orientation, but not sex, and therefore falling outside the reach of Title VII. 
Even if the employer’s policy covers sexual orientation discrimination and 
harassment, a plaintiff can lose the retaliation claim for unreasonably believing 
that anti-gay harassment violates Title VII.97 Many employer policies make no 
such artificial distinctions, however.98 
The reasonable belief cases are not limited to employee complaints about 
harassment. Other kinds of complaints about discrimination are also ensnared 
in this doctrine. One common case involves complaints about the employer’s 
failure to follow its affirmative action policy, such as by not bringing in a 
diverse group of candidates for a position, or not being sufficiently attentive to 
an institutional lack of diversity. In these cases, courts insist that the plaintiff 
lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the employer’s failure to engage in 
affirmative action or to promote diversity violated Title VII, without regard to 
the existence of employer policies blurring promises of diversity, affirmative 
action, and non-discrimination.99 Some of these cases arise in university 
settings, which have some of the broadest policies on diversity and affirmative 
action.100 
In all of these cases, the fact that the plaintiff followed an internal policy 
does not affect courts’ judgments about the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
complaint. Because courts do not find employer anti-discrimination policies 
relevant to the reasonable belief doctrine, they rarely discuss them in detail, 
making it virtually impossible to tell how the policies corresponded to 
plaintiffs’ perceptions of discrimination. 
While the courts do not specifically say that they are borrowing from tort 
law in these cases, the question this doctrine asks—whether the employee was 
reasonable in perceiving unlawful discrimination—has an obvious analogue in 
tort law’s reasonable person standard.101 Tort law uses reasonableness not just 
                                                                                                                     
 97 See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062–63, 1066 
(7th Cir. 2003); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 708 
(7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262–63 (1st 
Cir. 1999); Ogle v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 2:09-CV-317-PPS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116212, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 23, 2011). 
 98 See Sears & Mallory, supra note 83, at 1. 
 99 See, e.g., Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., No. 90-5603, 1991 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 3856, at *2–5 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1991); Miller-Calabrese v. Cont’l Grain Co., No. 
96 C 6626, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9944, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1997); Holden v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745, 748–49 (6th Cir. 1986). See also DOBBIN, supra note 
80, at 14 (discussing how employers came to merge nondiscrimination and affirmative 
action in their EEO policies). 
 100 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 566–68 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Manoharan v. Colum. Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 592–94 (2d 
Cir. 1988); Montgomery v. DePaul Univ., No. 10 C 78, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128206, at 
*25–30 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2012). 
 101 Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-
Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1352 (2010) (“The 
‘objective’ reasonable person standard . . . is a staple of tort law . . . .”). 
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to measure the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct (once a duty is 
established), but also the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct.102 The 
reasonable belief doctrine operates as a de facto rule of contributory 
negligence. 
If we adjust the tort lens a little, the reasonable belief doctrine might also 
be compared to a no-duty rule or, to a lesser extent, proximate cause. Much 
like a no-duty rule, the reasonable belief doctrine cuts off the employer’s duty 
not to retaliate in the class of cases where plaintiffs complain about 
discrimination that a supposedly reasonable person would know is not 
actionable. No-duty rules have been a focal point of contention in tort law 
increasingly in recent years, as a battleground for policy clashes over the 
proper scope of liability.103  
Alternatively, the reasonable belief doctrine might be compared to 
proximate cause. Like proximate cause, it limits the type of harm the 
defendant is expected to foresee and take care to avoid causing.104 The 
analogy to proximate cause is more of a stretch, however, because proximate 
cause typically cuts off liability for the defendant’s negligence when it results 
in a harm that differs from the harm normally to be expected; in a retaliation 
case, the adverse action (the firing, for example) is precisely the kind of harm 
anticipated.105 Still, proximate cause is notoriously malleable,106 and changing 
the level of generality used to describe the harm might sharpen the doctrine’s 
resemblance to proximate cause. If the harm is described more particularly, as 
firing an employee for acting on a mistaken belief about discrimination, the 
reasonable belief doctrine begins to look more like proximate cause, because it 
too places the harm outside the class of harms for which the defendant is 
liable.  
The “play” between the doctrines here, no-duty rules and proximate cause, 
is a manifestation of the slippery line separating them. In the final analysis, the 
potential for analogizing the reasonable belief doctrine to more than one tort 
doctrine speaks to the malleability of tort doctrine, rather than undermining the 
force of the comparison between the reasonable belief doctrine and 
contributory negligence. In my view, the reasonable belief doctrine’s focus on 
employee reasonableness makes contributory negligence the most on-point 
analogue. 
And yet, while retaliation’s reasonable belief doctrine generally tracks the 
role that plaintiff fault plays in tort law, in two important respects, it is more 
                                                                                                                     
 102 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 277 (2000) (discussing the objective 
reasonable person standard in tort law and stating, “[t]he standard applies equally when the 
issue is the plaintiff’s contributory negligence”). 
 103 See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 
703–13 (2008). 
 104 DOBBS, supra note 102, § 180, at 443–45. 
 105 I am indebted to Martha Chamallas for this insight. 
 106 See Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives 
on Skepticism, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 82 (2012). 
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draconian than its counterpart in torts. First, Title VII’s reasonable belief 
doctrine places a total bar on recovery. It functions similar to the harshest of 
the variations on plaintiff unreasonableness in tort law, the contributory 
negligence rule.107 While contributory negligence was once the majority rule, 
over time, reform has paved the way for a more calibrated approach to plaintiff 
fault.108 The majority rule now assesses comparative negligence and then 
reduces the plaintiff’s recovery to reflect the percentage of the parties’ 
respective fault.109 Jurisdictions vary in how they apply comparative 
negligence—some forbid any recovery if the plaintiff is more than fifty 
percent at fault, while others assess damages even if the plaintiff’s share of 
fault is higher.110 The reasonable belief doctrine invites no such comparison of 
the employee’s fault in misperceiving discrimination and the employer’s fault 
in promoting such an understanding through the promulgation of broad non-
discrimination policies.111 Title VII doctrine thus has a more anti-plaintiff bent 
than tort law’s approach to plaintiff fault. 
Second, retaliation parts ways with torts on the issue of perspective—from 
whose perspective to judge the plaintiff’s reasonableness. This departure is not 
quite so stark, however. Both tort law and Title VII retaliation law ignore one 
significant dimension of the plaintiff’s perspective: neither considers the way 
the plaintiff’s perspective is shaped by social group identity.112 Tort law does 
not use a “reasonable woman” perspective, for example, in asking if a female 
plaintiff acted negligently.113 Likewise, Title VII’s reasonable belief doctrine 
does not consider how a plaintiff’s race or gender shaped the perception of 
discrimination, even though research shows that subjective perceptions of 
discrimination vary greatly by race and gender.114 
Despite this similarity, however, the reasonable belief doctrine goes 
farther than tort law in disregarding the role of the plaintiff’s perspective in 
assessing reasonableness. Tort law’s approach to plaintiff fault allows external 
circumstances to bear on the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct.115 The 
reasonable belief cases, however, deny even this degree of subjectivity in the 
assessment of plaintiff reasonableness. Courts do not consider the employee’s 
access to legal knowledge or the circumstances in the workplace under which 
the employee formed the belief, such as the effect of an employer policy 
                                                                                                                     
 107 See DOBBS, supra note 102, § 199, at 494. 
 108 Id. § 201, at 503–04. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. § 201, at 505–06.  
 111 See supra pp. 1394–96. 
 112 See Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1358–61, 1368. 
 113 See id. at 1360–61. 
 114 See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the 
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276–80 (2012); Russell K. 
Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105–06 (2008). 
 115 Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1356–59 (contrasting external circumstances with 
internal circumstances—such as age, frailty, etc.—which are not taken into consideration). 
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addressing discrimination. Instead, judges measure reasonableness from their 
own legally informed perspective on whether the conduct violates Title VII. 
In addition to the doctrine of contributory negligence, plaintiff fault comes 
up in a more particularized way in the closest tort analogue to retaliation, the 
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. As discussed in more 
detail below, this is a notoriously stringent and difficult-to-win tort, and a 
terrible blueprint for the statutory retaliation claim. Even here, however, the 
role of plaintiff fault in this tort may not be quite as draconian as it is in the 
Title VII reasonable belief cases. In a wrongful discharge tort, the employee’s 
mistaken understanding, when it forms the basis for opposing perceived 
illegality by the employer, may pose a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.116 
However, some courts will permit recovery if the employee acted on a good 
faith belief.117 Even for those courts that require proof of actual illegality as 
the predicate for the employee’s protest, proof that the employer took actions 
contributing to the employee’s mistaken belief might be relevant to whether 
the tort claim may proceed.118 In the Title VII reasonable belief cases, in 
contrast, employer policies encouraging a broader view of discrimination do 
not affect how courts judge reasonableness, which is governed solely by the 
external law. 
So while the Title VII reasonable belief cases surreptitiously borrow from 
tort law’s reasonableness standard for measuring plaintiff fault, courts have 
applied reasonableness in a way that is more hostile to plaintiffs in retaliation 
cases. Tort concepts serve a similar function of narrowing the field of 
employer liability in another Title VII retaliation doctrine, discussed below. 
                                                                                                                     
 116 CRAIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 198 (discussing the role of the plaintiff’s mistaken 
belief in a wrongful discharge tort claim). 
 117 See, e.g., Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 786–87 (Okla. 1995) (noting 
precedents protecting “good faith reporting of infractions by the employer”); Palmer v. 
Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 687–90 (Kan. 1988) (protecting employee’s good faith reporting of 
employer’s unlawful misconduct); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 
(Minn. 1987) (same); Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. App. 
1989) (recognizing wrongful discharge tort claim where employee had a good faith belief 
that her employer required her to do an act that would violate the criminal law); McQuary 
v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 23–24 (Or. Ct. App.1984) (holding that 
“employee is protected from discharge for good faith reporting of what the employee 
believes to be patient mistreatment to an appropriate authority”); see also Stewart J. 
Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1943, 1970–71 (1996) (stating that tort law on wrongful discharge is “not always more 
sympathetic to a whistleblower who is correct than to one who merely acts in good faith,” 
and discussing cases protecting an employee who acts on a mistaken, but good faith, 
belief). 
 118 See Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Wash. 1989) (stating that, in deciding a 
tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on whistleblowing, 
“courts generally examine the degree of alleged employer wrongdoing, together with the 
reasonableness of the manner in which the employee reported, or attempted to remedy, the 
alleged misconduct”). 
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B. The Manager Rule, Employer Duty, and Proximate Cause 
A separate limit on protected activity under Title VII also has parallels 
with tort principles. In a development that has accelerated in recent years, 
lower courts have refused to find protected activity if the plaintiff performed 
her assigned responsibilities to report, investigate, or otherwise address 
discrimination in the workplace.119 The result is to effectively cut off the 
employer’s duty not to retaliate against employees whose job responsibilities 
include oversight and enforcement of internal anti-discrimination policies. 
Some courts call this the manager rule, while others describe the doctrine as 
requiring employees with anti-discrimination compliance responsibilities to 
step outside their roles.120 This doctrine has roots in other areas of 
employment law, both statutory and constitutional, and has increasingly 
worked its way into Title VII.121 
A recent case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Brush v. Sears 
Holdings Corp., illustrates the doctrine.122 Janet Brush’s duties included 
investigating allegations of sexual harassment in the workplace.123 In the 
course of one such investigation, Brush discovered that a female employee’s 
allegations of sexual harassment were more serious than first appeared, 
involving several instances of rape by a supervisor.124 Brush took the position 
that the alleged rapes should be reported to the police, but her superiors 
disagreed.125 Brush was fired, she claimed because of her insistence that Sears 
report the rapes to the police.126 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that even if true, 
Brush did not engage in protected activity under Title VII.127 In sweeping 
reasoning, the court articulated its agreement with the manager rule, describing 
it as follows: “[T]he manager rule holds that a management employee that, in 
the course of her normal job performance, disagrees with or opposes the 
actions of an employer does not engage in protected activity.”128 In order for 
her normal job performance to become “protected activity,” the court 
continued, she “must cross the line from . . . performing her 
                                                                                                                     
 119 See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1481 (10th Cir. 1996) (personnel 
director did not engage in protected activity under the FLSA when she acted within her 
official role to correct wage and hour disparities); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 424 (2006) (public employee did not engage in protected speech under the First 
Amendment when she publicly complained about employer’s misconduct because she 
acted within her official duties). 
 122 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App’x 781 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 123 Id. at 783. 
 124 Id. at 784. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 783. 
 128 Brush, 466 Fed. App’x at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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job . . . to . . . lodging a personal complaint.”129 Absent a personal complaint, 
and “where . . . a third party is neither directly interested in the underlying 
discrimination nor acting beyond the scope of her employment in opposing an 
employer’s action, no Title VII claim will lie.”130 The court’s reasoning uses 
the plaintiff’s scope of employment to cut short the defendant’s duty not to 
retaliate.131 
Brush is representative of a trend in the lower courts to deny protected 
activity where the plaintiff acted within the scope of her job’s duties to address 
internal discrimination complaints. While the particular result in Brush might 
be defended as the court’s way of handling a reasonable difference of opinion 
between Brush and Sears over how, within the obligations of Title VII, to best 
respond to rape allegations, the court’s reasoning was not so limited.132 Other 
courts have applied the manager rule to fact patterns where the dispute goes 
beyond a reasonable difference in opinion over the best way to deal with a 
complaint about discrimination. In one such case, Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. 
Printing, Inc.,133 the plaintiff was a human resources director who received 
several complaints from employees alleging that they had been sexually 
harassed by the company president and vice-president, who were brothers.134 
When the plaintiff informed the brothers of his plans to investigate the 
allegations, they ordered him not to do so, assuring him that they would handle 
it themselves.135 The plaintiff disagreed with this course of conduct and was 
fired.136 The court dismissed the retaliation claim for lack of protected 
activity.137 As human resources director, the court explained, the plaintiff’s 
actions fell within his job responsibilities and were taken for the benefit of the 
company.138 Like the court in Brush, this court distinguished between a human 
resources employee who filed a complaint on his own behalf, which would be 
protected, and this plaintiff’s actions to address the complaints of others, 
which were not protected.139 
The logic of the manager rule is not limited to officially designated equal 
employment opportunity (EEO) compliance personnel. Taken to its logical 
extreme, the rule could extend to any employee whose supervisory 
responsibilities include bringing forward and addressing the complaints of 
subordinates. For example, in Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing 
                                                                                                                     
 129 Id. (quoting McKenzie v. Renberg’s Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 130 Id. at 788 n.8. 
 131 Id. at 787–88. 
 132 Id. at 784–87. 
 133 Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.P.R. 2005). 
 134  Id. at 61. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. at 62 
 138  Id. 
 139  Vidal, 380 F.2d at 62. 
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Alabama, LLC,140 the court applied this doctrine to bar a retaliation claim by a 
manager who reported the discrimination complaints of persons he supervised 
and then was fired.141 The court denied the existence of protected activity, 
explaining that it was part of his job to alert the company to potentially 
unlawful conduct; because he did not step outside of his assigned role, he did 
not engage in opposition adversarial to the company.142 
The manager rule creates a dilemma for the employees it covers, 
especially when viewed in light of the broader framework of Title VII 
retaliation law. A separate retaliation doctrine denies protected activity under 
the opposition clause when the plaintiff opposes discrimination in an 
unreasonable manner, such as by being disruptive or insubordinate. Under this 
doctrine, an employee who, in the course of opposing discrimination, steps too 
far outside her assigned role risks being fired for insubordination and 
disloyalty. In a line of cases that began before the manager rule emerged, 
courts rejected retaliation claims brought by employees with EEO 
responsibilities for going beyond their assigned roles in the course of 
performing their job duties.143 For example, in a case decided by the D.C. 
Circuit in 1980, the court denied a retaliation claim brought by federal 
employees serving as EEO counselors who were fired for being “too militant” 
by participating in a protest demonstration against unequal employment 
opportunities in the department.144 The court faulted the plaintiffs for going 
beyond the EEO counseling functions of the job.145 Courts continue to enforce 
this line, requiring the form of the opposition to be reasonable.146 There is 
scant space between stepping outside an employee’s assigned role and steering 
clear of insubordination and disloyalty so as to make the form of the 
opposition unreasonable. 
In applying the manager rule, courts use the employer’s assignment of 
anti-discrimination compliance responsibilities to deny protection from 
retaliation to the employees performing those responsibilities, even when the 
employee acts in a manner that would otherwise register as opposition to 
discrimination. What purpose does this doctrine serve? One possibility is that 
it functions as a quick-look judgment about causation-in-fact, based on an 
assumption that an employer would not delegate anti-discrimination 
responsibilities and then fire an employee for performing them. If this is the 
assumption beneath the doctrine, however, it is misplaced. It ignores the 
                                                                                                                     
 140 Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, No. 2:07cv144-ID, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33826 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2008). 
 141 Id. at *38–39. 
 142 Id. at *35–39. 
 143 See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 728–29 (5th Cir. 1986); Hochstadt 
v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 144 Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102, 108–09 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See, e.g., Burns v. Blackhawk Mgmt. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 427, 433–36 (S.D. 
Miss. 2007); Velez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 389 F. Supp. 2d 253, 260–62 (D.P.R. 2005). 
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benefits employers reap by having anti-discrimination policies and personnel 
to implement them—benefits discussed in Part IV below.147 The adoption of 
anti-discrimination policies and the assignment of employees to administer 
them may reflect an employer’s strategic self-interest rather than a principled 
commitment to workplace equality. 
Rather than a proxy for causation-in-fact, the manager rule is better 
understood as a curtailment of the employer’s duty not to retaliate. The 
manager rule functions like a no-duty rule in torts, cutting off the defendant’s 
liability notwithstanding the defendant’s action causing injury. No-duty rules 
have become a favored vehicle for grappling with the kinds of controversial 
policy judgments that proximate cause is known for tackling.148 Martha 
Chamallas’s study of third-party assault torts is instructive.149 She traces the 
shift from proximate cause to no-duty rules in third-party sexual assault cases 
brought by victims against an institutional defendant that might have done 
more to prevent attacks on its premises.150 Instead of adjudicating such 
assaults to be not foreseeable, courts ruling against plaintiffs now more 
typically limit the defendant’s duty to protect against criminal sexual assaults 
by a third party. While the determination of whether a tort defendant breached 
a duty is usually made by the jury, the determination of whether the defendant 
had a duty in the first place is a question of law determined by the court.151  
Similar to a no-duty rule, the manager rule requires courts to make 
surreptitious policy judgments in order to decide, as a matter of law, the scope 
of the employer’s duty not to retaliate. By negating the element of protected 
activity, the rule voids any duty on the part of the employer not to retaliate 
against the plaintiff; in contrast, the question of whether the defendant acted 
for a retaliatory reason is a question of fact.152 By keeping the case away from 
the jury, both the manager rule and no-duty rules in tort protect defendants 
from liability. 
Like the reasonable belief doctrine, the manager rule might be 
productively compared to more than one tort doctrine. It too bears a similarity 
to proximate cause—a resemblance that is unsurprising given the porosity of 
the line separating proximate cause from no-duty rules. Proximate cause 
insists that it is not enough that the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused harm 
to someone; it must have been wrongful toward the plaintiff or the class of 
persons to whom the plaintiff belongs.153 This principle is now submerged in 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ phrase, “scope of liability,” which limits the 
                                                                                                                     
 147 See infra Part IV. 
 148 Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1371–72. On the slipperiness of the categories of 
proximate cause and no-duty rules, see DOBBS, supra note 102, at 584–85. 
 149 See Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1371–72. 
 150 Id. at 1374. 
 151 Id. at 1380. 
 152 See B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 458–59 (2008) (summarizing 
how the element of causation is established in retaliation cases). 
 153 See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1460. 
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defendant’s liability to those harms resulting from the same risks that made the 
defendant’s conduct tortious in the first place.154  
To return to Brush, the court in that case emphasized that the plaintiff 
herself was not the victim of the alleged discrimination.155 In the terminology 
of proximate cause, Brush was a bystander who was harmed by the employer’s 
hostility to the employee who made the rape accusation; that hostility landed 
on Brush when she insisted on a stronger response to the accusation than the 
employer was prepared to take. Using language with echoes of proximate 
cause, the Brush court expressed skepticism about the “transitive property” of 
Title VII claims in terms of providing any remedy to Brush, emphasizing that 
she was not among those “directly impacted” by the underlying 
discrimination.156 By invoking the manager rule to block Title VII from 
protecting persons not directly targeted by the discrimination, the court’s 
opinion carries the ring of proximate cause. 
As scholars have long observed, proximate cause functions as a tool to cut 
off liability in service of other policy objectives.157 In this respect, it is 
functionally similar to no-duty rules.158 
Whether compared to proximate cause or no-duty rules, the manager rule 
bears considerable resemblance to tort principles. But like the reasonable 
belief doctrine, there is both congruity and distortion in its tracking of tort 
principles. The selective draw from torts has made Title VII’s manager rule 
more draconian than a carefully considered use of tort law for guidance would 
support. A critical look at the particularities of this tort analogy would expose 
the difficulties created by the manager rule and might prompt a rethinking of 
its suitability for Title VII retaliation cases. 
One way that the manager rule departs from tort law is in its use of agency 
principles. Typically in tort law, scope of employment is used to impute an 
employee’s wrongful action to the employer for purposes of establishing 
employer liability.159 The manager rule, in contrast, uses scope of employment 
principles to cut off the employer’s duty not to retaliate when the plaintiff acts 
within the scope of employment. Tort law uses scope of employment 
principles to impute employer liability, while the manager rule uses it to cut 
off employer liability. In torts, the focus is on the wrongdoer’s scope of 
                                                                                                                     
 154 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 (2010). 
 155 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1467; see also Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 
supra note 47, at 1202–05. 
 158 Cf. Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1374 (explaining that in third-party assault cases 
courts have vacillated over time between no-duty rules and proximate cause as the vehicle 
for cutting off the defendant’s liability). 
 159 See Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 133, 136 (2013) (discussing scope of employment and vicarious liability rules in 
tort law). 
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employment in order to determine who acts on behalf of the defendant, while 
the manager rule uses the plaintiff’s scope of employment to block employer 
liability. In this respect, the manager rule is more of a distortion than an 
embrace of tort’s scope of employment principles. 
One possible parallel in tort law to the manager rule’s use of scope of 
employment is in the tort of wrongful discharge. However, this similarity may 
be due as much to the circularity of Title VII’s influence on tort law as to the 
independent development of tort principles in this ill-defined tort. In the 
wrongful discharge tort, too, an employee may end up outside the law’s 
protection if the employee acted within her job duties to oppose the 
employer’s misconduct. For example, in one case where the plaintiff was a 
safety compliance officer in an industrial workplace, the plaintiff alleged that 
he was fired for his efforts to correct the employer’s environmental record and 
for bringing compliance issues to the attention of a government enforcement 
agency.160 In a resulting claim for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy, the court ruled against the plaintiff on the ground that he 
acted within the scope of his job responsibilities, which included oversight of 
safety and compliance with environmental and safety regulations. This is a 
case, however, in which Title VII doctrine appeared to shape the court’s use of 
tort principles. The court implicitly analogized the tort of wrongful discharge 
to a Title VII claim for retaliation, citing Title VII cases applying the manager 
rule to support the line it drew in the wrongful discharge action, and cutting 
off liability based on the plaintiff’s scope of employment.161 
To the extent that Title VII’s manager rule is taking its cue from tort law’s 
wrongful discharge case law on the plaintiff’s scope of employment, it is a 
very poor body of law from which to draw support for this doctrine. Despite 
the occasional case tracking the manager rule, the wrongful discharge case law 
contains more cases cutting in the opposite direction, denying recovery to 
employees who act outside their job expertise to report or oppose employer 
misconduct. Courts have denied recovery in wrongful discharge cases where 
the employee protested illegality by the employer, but lacked the job expertise 
to credibly evaluate the legality of the employer’s actions.162 It seems that 
wrongful discharge plaintiffs can lose their cases whichever side of this line 
                                                                                                                     
 160 Hill v. Belk Store Servs., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-398, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79239, at 
*1–3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2007). 
 161 Id. at *3–4 (citing Title VII precedents). 
 162 See, e.g., Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(denying wrongful discharge tort, and requiring the employee reporting employer 
misconduct to have responsibility for the subject matter of the complaint); Sheets v. 
Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc. 427 A.2d 385, 388–89 (Conn. 1980) (permitting plaintiff to 
bring a wrongful discharge claim, and emphasizing that he did have expertise and 
responsibility for the subject matter of his complaints); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 
174, 178–79 (Pa. 1974) (denying wrongful discharge tort claim where plaintiff, a sales 
representative, lacked the expertise and corporate responsibility to complain about 
perceived safety problems). 
1398 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
they straddle. Title VII retaliation law should not be replicating this 
incoherence, although, as discussed above, that is precisely what is happening. 
The Title VII case law simultaneously requires managerial employees to step 
outside their roles in order to engage in protected activity, and yet punishes 
them for doing so if they act insubordinately or disloyally. Rather than 
squaring with generally applicable tort principles, the manager rule appears to 
be tracking the incoherence and damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t 
tension in the wrongful discharge tort. 
The wrongful discharge tort shares other, equally ill-suited principles with 
the Title VII case law applying the manager rule. The wrongful discharge tort 
sets a notoriously high bar for the venality of employer misconduct that the 
plaintiff opposed. It is a common refrain for courts in wrongful discharge 
cases, in the course of ruling against the plaintiff, to point out that the 
employer did not force the discharged employee to do anything that would 
violate the criminal law.163 The court in Brush echoed this refrain, taking pains 
to point out that the employer did not violate the criminal law in refusing to 
report the rapes to the police, nor force the plaintiff to commit a crime when it 
instructed her not to report the rapes.164 While setting the threshold for 
employer misconduct at the level of criminal law is draconian even for the 
wrongful discharge claim, it is especially unsuitable for Title VII, which 
protects the civil rights of employees to a non-discriminatory workplace. 
Allowing the strict limits of the wrongful discharge claim into the retaliation 
claim gives insufficient room for employees to act in the role Congress 
envisioned as “private attorney general” to enforce Title VII.165 
The tort of wrongful discharge is also a poor model for Title VII 
retaliation claims in its distinction between public and private wrongdoing, 
and its protection of employee actions opposing the former but not the latter. 
To succeed in a wrongful discharge tort claim, courts insist that the employee 
acted to vindicate a public interest and not merely a private interest.166 This is 
a notoriously porous line.167 For example, courts have dismissed wrongful 
                                                                                                                     
 163 See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 256 (Ariz. 1986) (distinguishing 
employee actions to report employer wrongdoing from employee resistance to performing 
a criminal act, and suggesting greater protection of the latter); Sheets, 427 A.2d at 388 
(recognizing wrongful discharge tort claim, and noting that “[t]he plaintiff’s position as 
quality control director and operations manager might have exposed him to the possibility 
of criminal prosecution under” federal law); City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 
215–16 (Tex. 2000) (limiting wrongful discharge claims to cases where employer required 
the employee to violate the criminal law); Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 862 
(Utah 1997) (denying recovery and emphasizing that the employer had not required the 
plaintiff to commit a criminal act). 
 164 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App’x 781, 788 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 165 See N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980). 
 166 Schwab, supra note 117, at 1944–45. 
 167 See id. at 1944 (describing this public-private distinction as “treacherous at best”); 
see also Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878–79 (Ill. 1981) (stating that 
“a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities 
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discharge claims in which the plaintiff reported another employee’s illegal 
theft, explaining that the plaintiff did not exercise a legal right or interest of his 
own, but intervened in a mere private matter between the employer and the co-
worker.168 Other cases classify an employee’s whistleblowing to prevent the 
employer from violating the law and incurring a penalty as involving only a 
private matter, for the benefit of the employer.169 These rulings purport to 
distinguish workplace-related wrongdoing that affects the public interest from 
that affecting only the private interest of the employer or employees. 
As problematic as this distinction has proven to be in wrongful discharge 
cases, it is all the more so in cases applying the manager rule. The manager 
rule cases also deny protection to plaintiffs for addressing the rights of other 
employees, instead of pressing their own complaints. In Brush, for example, 
the court suggested the possibility of a different result if the plaintiff had acted 
to protect her own rights to non-discrimination instead of those of a fellow 
employee.170 Presumably, the court recognized that an employee who asserts 
her own rights fulfills the private attorney general role of enforcing Title VII, 
in service of the public interest. However, such a divide between the 
employee’s own rights and the rights of fellow workers is incoherent as 
applied to Title VII retaliation claims. Protecting the Title VII rights of other 
                                                                                                                     
before the tort will be allowed,” but acknowledging that “there is no precise line of 
demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely 
personal”). Not only is the public-private line porous, it invites the kind of public-private 
dichotomy that feminist scholars have shown to marginalize those harms especially 
affecting women. See, e.g., Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
(refusing to recognize wrongful discharge claim for employer’s firing of an employee who 
was beaten and raped by her ex-husband, because employer’s desire not to deal with this 
situation did not implicate a sufficiently public interest); MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER 
B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER AND TORT LAW 76–87 (2010). 
 168 See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 785–88 (Okla. 1995) (finding that 
employee’s reporting of criminal activity—embezzlement by a co-worker—did not 
implicate a sufficiently “public” policy to give rise to a wrongful discharge tort claim); 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (holding employee fired for 
reporting that supervisor was under investigation for embezzlement did not have a 
wrongful discharge tort claim because the employee’s action served “only the private 
interest of the employer”). 
 169 See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(finding that employee’s reporting of employer’s illegality did not sufficiently implicate 
public policy so as to give rise to a wrongful discharge claim, and stating that wrongful 
discharge claims should be limited to “situations involving the actual refusal to engage in 
illegal activity, or the intention to fulfill a statutorily prescribed duty”); Foley, 765 P.2d at 
380 (distinguishing protection of an employer’s private interest in avoiding penalties from 
the public interest). 
 170 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App’x 781, 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2012); cf. 
Hayes, 905 P.2d at 786–88 (emphasizing that employee who reported co-worker’s 
embezzlement was “not exercising any legal right or interest of his own,” and 
distinguishing cases where employees are fired for seeking to vindicate their own legal 
rights). 
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employees is just as much in the public interest as the promotion of one’s own 
Title VII rights.171 Recognizing this, retaliation law generally protects persons 
advocating for the non-discrimination rights of others.172 It also protects 
persons targeted by the employer because of their relationship to the 
complainant, at least if the relationship is a sufficiently close one.173 There is 
no principled reason why managers should have any less protection for 
protecting the rights of other employees, even if such activity falls within their 
job descriptions, than if they asserted their own rights. To the extent the 
manager rule is replicating this dichotomy from the wrongful discharge tort, 
the transplant is a gross mismatch. 
The underlying policy served by both the manager rule and the tight limits 
on the tort of wrongful discharge is essentially the same policy that underlies 
tort law’s no-duty rules and proximate cause: cutting off liability to protect the 
defendant’s freedom of action. In the employment setting, this preserves the 
baseline of employment at will. The tort of wrongful discharge is an especially 
effective vehicle for promoting this objective. The tort is known for its 
stringency toward plaintiffs.174 Expressing a widely shared sentiment, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut summed up a common judicial reaction to this 
tort: “We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the 
exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation.”175 
Toward that end, the tort is ill-defined and difficult for plaintiffs to win.176 
This stringency reflects the tort’s common law underpinnings as a narrow, 
judicially-crafted intrusion into employment at will, triggering separation of 
powers concerns that leave courts vulnerable to criticism for crafting judicial 
remedies for violations of public policy that legislatures have not created.177 
                                                                                                                     
 171 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1665–66 (1996) (contending that retaliation protections for enforcing 
statutory rights serve the public just as much as, and for the same reasons as, the 
underlying substantive rights protected in the statute). 
 172 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 273 
(2009) (holding that Title VII opposition clause protects employee for testifying in support 
of complainant in employer’s internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint); 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (deciding that Title IX 
protects a school basketball coach who opposed discrimination against student-athletes on 
his team). 
 173 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867, 870 (2011) (finding 
that employer’s retaliatory firing of the fiancé of the complainant violates Title VII). 
 174 See Slater, supra note 43, at 98 (“Many of the states recognizing the public policy 
exception [to at-will employment] have defined public policy very narrowly, such that only 
a ‘handful of employees’ can use the tort of wrongful discharge.”); see also Hayes, 905 
P.2d at 785 (noting that the claim is “to be tightly circumscribed in light of the vague 
meaning of the term public policy”). 
 175 Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc. 427 A.2d 385, 387–88 (Conn. 1980). 
 176 See Estlund, supra note 171, at 1669–70. 
 177 See, e.g., Hill v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 3:06-cv-398, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
79239 at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2007) (“Courts in North Carolina are institutionally averse 
to creating claims based on public policy.”); Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 
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Focusing on the underlying objectives served by Title VII’s analogy to 
torts might help sort out which particular analogies to tort law are appropriate 
for retaliation law and which are not. The wrongful discharge tort is an 
exceptionally poor model for the Title VII retaliation claim. The statutory 
claim does not raise the separation of powers ghost that haunts the tort of 
wrongful discharge. As a statutory incursion into employment at will, Title VII 
retaliation law should be guided foremost by the objectives of the statute. 
Instead, the manager rule re-inscribes employer autonomy over the workplace 
for a significant class of employees.  
And yet, there is a degree of legitimacy in the policy concerns driving the 
manager rule. Courts’ embrace of the manager rule reflects a legitimate 
concern that, without it, employers would lose the ability to supervise job 
performance for some segment of the workforce. The fundamental problem 
driving the manager rule is that, when part of the employee’s job is to oversee 
compliance with anti-discrimination law, the search for a retaliatory motive 
cannot separate the illegitimate motive of retaliation from the legitimate 
motive of job performance.178 For employees charged with enforcing anti-
discrimination laws and policies in the workplace, punishing the employee for 
how she performs this responsibility is both retaliatory and related to job 
performance. Without the manager rule, when securing compliance with non-
discrimination laws and policies falls within employees’ job duties, the 
retaliation claim would deeply intrude into employer oversight of this group of 
employees. On the other hand, the manager rule tilts the scales all the way in 
the opposite direction, causing a complete withdrawal of retaliation protection 
from the employees assigned such job responsibilities, effectively removing 
them from Title VII’s antiretaliation exception to employment at will. Instead 
of a nuanced calibration of the conflicting employee and employer interests in 
such conflicts, the manager rule selectively follows and distorts tort-like 
principles to bolster the employment at will default regime. 
Both the reasonable belief doctrine and the manager rule serve the same 
core objective: reinvigorating the common law baseline of employment at will 
                                                                                                                     
1992) (“[C]ourts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to 
the judgment of the legislative branch, lest they mistake their own predilections for public 
policy which deserves recognition at law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Murphy v. 
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89–90 (N.Y. 1983) (refusing to recognize tort for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, stating such rights “are best and more 
appropriately explored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government”). 
 178 See, e.g., Correa v. Mana Prods., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(explaining that, without such a rule, employees with EEO responsibilities would be 
untouchable, a result that would intrude too deeply into the employer’s ability to oversee 
job performance); cf. Whatley v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325, 1326 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that Title VII does not prevent an employer from firing an employee 
whose job it is to handle discrimination complaints when the employee does this contrary 
to the employer’s instructions). 
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and limiting the extent of Title VII’s statutory incursion into that baseline.179 
So far, tort’s footprints in Title VII retaliation law have led in only one 
direction, walking back the protection the law extends to employees. The next 
section calls for greater attention to a side of tort law that has been missing so 
far in tort’s influence on Title VII retaliation law: the nature and degree of the 
defendant’s wrongfulness. 
IV. TAKING TORTS SERIOUSLY 
Despite the one-way influence of tort law to date in cutting back Title VII 
liability for retaliation, there is room for making tort’s role in this area more of 
a two-way street. Rather than putting all efforts into resisting the intrusion of 
torts into Title VII retaliation law—a losing proposition after Nassar—Title 
VII scholars should undertake a reconstructive approach. 
At a minimum, a forthright acknowledgement of tort law’s impact on Title 
VII retaliation doctrine should call attention to the ways Title VII case law has 
selectively imported tort principles to curtail employer liability, distorting 
those principles in the process. As discussed above, both the reasonable belief 
doctrine and the manager rule, in tracking tort principles go farther in 
protecting employer autonomy than tort principles dictate. The reasonable 
belief doctrine stretches tort principles of plaintiff fault to reach a more 
draconian result than analogous tort doctrines would require. The manager rule 
lines up with malleable tort rules (no-duty and proximate cause) that mask 
judicial policy preferences; and to the extent it follows more particularized tort 
doctrine, it aligns with an especially stingy tort—the wrongful discharge 
claim—to a degree unsuitable for Title VII’s statutory claim. Bringing tort 
concepts out of the shadows and into the light should prompt a reconsideration 
of the Title VII doctrines that have significantly narrowed the scope of 
protected activity under the opposition clause. It also illuminates the extent to 
which the Title VII retaliation case law has reinvigorated the employment at 
will common law background rules, notwithstanding the purported statutory 
incursion into that regime. 
In addition to taking a more critical look at how courts have used tort-like 
principles to limit Title VII liability, tort law might be mined for its potential 
to place employer fault at the forefront of the analysis in a retaliation claim. In 
Nassar, the Court repeatedly characterized the retaliation claim as a remedy 
for “wrongful” action by the employer.180 The wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
conduct, as a matter of social policy, is at the foundation of tort law; it is what 
fundamentally distinguishes torts from civil actions to enforce contract or 
                                                                                                                     
 179 Cf. Slater, supra note 43, at 97 (arguing that the common law baseline of 
employment at will has encroached into its statutory exceptions, such as Title VII, because 
courts have interpreted these statutory rights very narrowly). 
 180 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522, 2525 (2013). In the 
first two paragraphs alone, the Court used the word “wrong,” and words derived from it, 
five times. Id. at 2522. 
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property rights.181 Even the wrongful discharge claim, with its strict limits on 
what is actionable, makes employer wrongfulness the focal point, as the very 
name of the tort suggests. Courts describe the tort of wrongful discharge as 
remedying an employer action that is “ex delicto”—from a wrong.182 
So far, Title VII doctrine limiting the scope of protected activity has 
invoked tort-inspired limits on plaintiff recovery without a corresponding 
emphasis on employer fault. But tort law’s fault-based focus could also 
strengthen Title VII protection by more fully developing courts’ understanding 
of employer wrongfulness in the retaliation claim. Both the reasonable belief 
doctrine and the manager rule, as applied by the lower courts, have let 
employers reap the benefits of having anti-discrimination policies while 
punishing the employees who use and administer them. Tort law might help 
construct theories of wrongfulness to address this unfairness and ameliorate 
the harshness of these doctrines. 
A starting point for probing employer wrongfulness is through the lens of 
intentional torts. In a retaliation claim, the adverse action is no accident.183 If 
the adverse action occurs because of a retaliatory intent, it is both wrongful 
and intentional. Professor Sandra Sperino’s argument that the closest tort 
analogue to employment discrimination is intentional torts rather than 
negligence applies equally to retaliation.184 
The analogy between retaliation and intentional torts is complex and more 
nuanced, however.185 Intentional torts typically involve deliberate (that is, not 
accidental) actions done with intent to harm or knowledge of a substantial 
likelihood of causing harm.186 In an employment discrimination claim such as 
retaliation, the adverse employment action—the firing for example—is 
intentional, but its wrongfulness depends on the reason, or motive, for why it 
                                                                                                                     
 181 See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 1 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:1, at 5–6 
(2003). 
 182 See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980) (stating that “an 
employee’s action for wrongful discharge is ex delicto and subjects an employer to tort 
liability”). 
 183 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2005) 
(“Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act.”); see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 
S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (analogizing the USERRA claim to an intentional tort, as opposed 
to negligence, because it requires “that the actor intend the consequences of an act, not 
simply the act itself”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184 Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 47, at 37–38; see also Sullivan, supra 
note 47, at 1459 (“[A] disparate-treatment Title VII violation is more akin to an intentional 
tort.”). 
 185 Perhaps it is the difficulty of settling on a tort analogy for retaliation that prompted 
the Court to cite from a grab bag of tort principles, lumping in both negligence and 
intentional torts. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing Restatement provisions on negligence 
and intentional torts). 
 186 See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1061, 1063 (2006) (discussing the definition of intent in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts). 
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was done. It is not the deliberate causing of harm that makes the adverse 
employment action unlawful under Title VII. Even non-retaliatory firings 
intentionally cause harm to the person fired. It is the intentionality of the 
action combined with the wrongful reason for the action that makes it 
unlawful. 
This difference should not necessarily defeat the analogy to intentional 
torts, however. With intentional torts, too, the reason for the intentional act 
that causes harm may be relevant to the wrongfulness of the action, even if its 
relevance is not always made explicit. For example, if the reason for hitting 
someone is justified, such as intervening in an attack on a child, the 
defendant’s intent to throw a punch is not enough to make it actionable.187 It is 
the lack of justification for the punch, combined with the intent to harm, that 
gives rise to the tort, as it is the retaliatory motive for the firing that makes the 
retaliatory firing actionable. In retaliation claims and intentional torts, the 
intentionality of the defendant’s action, combined with the illegitimate motive 
(or lack of justification), gives rise to the claim. 
The analogy to intentional torts alone, however, will not fend off tort-
based incursions into protected activity under Title VII. Grounding the 
wrongfulness of the adverse action in the employer’s retaliatory motive circles 
right back to where the reasonable belief doctrine and the manager rule 
entered, wrestling with the proper scope of protected activity. Whether the 
employer acted with a retaliatory motive turns on the scope of protected 
activity under the statute. Only if the employer acted with a motive to punish 
employee conduct that qualifies as protected activity does the motive qualify 
as retaliatory. A motive to punish an employee for complaining about 
something that is not protected by the statute, for example, would not be 
retaliatory under Title VII. 
Where the analogy to intentional torts might help is in defining the proper 
scope of protected activity. Courts should calibrate the boundary of protected 
activity to fit the nature and degree of the employer’s wrongfulness. For the 
retaliation claim to fulfill its purpose—keeping open the channels for 
enforcing statutory rights, including internal opposition to discrimination—the 
category of protected activity must be expansive enough to capture the core 
wrong of retaliation. In cases where the employee follows or administers an 
employer’s non-discrimination policy to report or address discrimination 
covered by that policy, thereby triggering employer retaliation, there are two 
                                                                                                                     
 187 See 8 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 181, § 26:10, at 289 (on the defense of others as a 
defense to battery). Justification also matters in the tort of wrongful discharge. See Ellis v. 
City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Wash. 2000) (listing among the elements of a claim 
for wrongful discharge in violation against public policy that “[t]he defendant must not be 
able to offer an overriding justification for the dismissal”); see also Simons, supra note 
186, at 1084 & n.84 (discussing the “prima facie” tort of intentionally causing harm, and 
quoting the Restatement (Second) definition that the conduct “is generally culpable and not 
justifiable under the circumstances”). 
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dimensions of employer wrongfulness that the definition of protected activity 
should take into account. 
First, there is the wrongfulness toward the individual employee who is 
encouraged to use or administer the employer’s policy on non-discrimination 
and then punished for doing so. When the retaliation claim is brought under 
the opposition clause and the opposition is expressed through the employer’s 
internal complaint procedures, there is a distinct dimension of wrongfulness to 
the employer’s retaliation. Not only does the retaliation interfere with the work 
lives of individual employees and the enforcement of statutory rights, it 
enables the employer to have its cake and eat it too: the employer benefits 
from having an anti-discrimination policy—benefits discussed in greater detail 
below188—even though the policy is effectively nullified by the retaliation. It 
is tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment (a 
principle rooted in corrective justice) for the employer to benefit from having 
anti-discrimination policies, while retaliating against the employees who use 
and administer them.189 In this respect, the retaliation claim under the 
opposition clause has an additional dimension of wrongfulness compared to a 
Title VII participation clause claim, where the employee is punished for using 
the statute’s official enforcement mechanisms. When the employer’s policy 
encouraged the employee’s opposition, the wrongfulness of the retaliation is 
heightened by the employer’s self-serving decision to capture the benefits of 
having anti-discrimination policies while punishing their use. The focus of 
intentional torts on defendant wrongfulness might productively call attention 
to this dimension of employer wrongfulness, which the case law on protected 
activity so far has failed to consider. 
A second type of wrong addressed by the retaliation claim is the public 
harm to law enforcement stemming from the employer’s interference with the 
enforcement of statutory rights. The scope of protected activity should be 
broad enough to reflect the role played by internal anti-discrimination policies 
in the enforcement of statutory rights. By now, employer anti-discrimination 
policies have been so thoroughly integrated into Title VII’s statutory 
framework—a point discussed in more depth below190—that sabotaging their 
use thwarts statutory rights just as much as an employer’s interference with 
external enforcement channels. 
                                                                                                                     
 188 See infra pp. 1407–11. 
 189 See DOBBS, supra note 102, §§ 469–470, at 1343–46 (discussing fraudulent 
misrepresentation). Although unjust enrichment defies easy categorization in the traditional 
common law categories of tort, property and contracts, it shares an animating theory of 
corrective justice with tort law. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: 
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802–11 (1997) 
(discussing the corrective justice underpinnings of tort law); Lionel Smith, Restitution: The 
Heart of Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 2115 (2001) (arguing that unjust 
enrichment is based on a theory of corrective justice);. 
 190 See infra pp. 1420–21. 
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The analogy to intentional torts might also be marshaled to resist the 
particular ways lower courts have used the reasonable belief doctrine and 
manager rule to circumscribe protected activity under Title VII. If retaliation is 
an intentional tort, proximate cause-type limits on protected activity are out of 
place. Proximate cause does not play the same role in intentional torts as in 
negligence-based wrongs.191 In an intentional tort, the defendant is more likely 
to be liable for the full extent of the harm, without regard to foreseeability.192 
The defendant’s culpability—the seriousness of the harm and the degree of the 
deviation from “appropriate care”—can reduce the role proximate cause plays 
in limiting liability.193 To the extent that both the reasonable belief doctrine 
and the manager rule are tracking proximate cause-inspired limits on liability, 
aligning retaliation with intentional torts might help check these doctrines. 
The analogy to intentional torts could also be used to question overly 
stringent applications of plaintiff fault as a limit on protected activity. As 
discussed above, the reasonable belief doctrine mimics tort-inspired limits on 
plaintiff fault, akin to a de facto contributory negligence rule. However, 
contributory negligence does not negate liability for an intentional tort. A 
defendant’s wrongfulness in intentionally causing harm is not ameliorated by 
the injured person’s failure to take reasonable care to avoid the harm.194 
Analogizing retaliation to an intentional tort might help rein in the reasonable 
belief rule, at least insofar as the employee’s belief about discrimination 
conforms to the employer’s anti-discrimination policy. 
Even if the analogy to intentional torts falters and negligence emerges as 
the guiding tort framework for the Title VII retaliation claim, fault-based 
concepts should be developed to resist the tort-inspired limits on protected 
activity that have taken hold in the case law. Under a negligence framework, 
both the duty not to retaliate (in relation to managerial employees) and the role 
of contributory negligence (in the form of the reasonable belief doctrine) 
should be calibrated to take into account the full scope of the employer’s 
wrongfulness.195 In retaliation claims brought under the opposition clause, the 
wrongfulness of the adverse action is heightened by the employer’s decision to 
                                                                                                                     
 191 See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 47, at 10; Sperino, Statutory 
Proximate Cause, supra note 47, at 1206–07; Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1459. 
 192 Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 47, at 1206. 
 193 Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (2010)). 
 194 See DOBBS, supra note 102, § 200, at 498; Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1381; see 
also DOBBS, supra note 102, § 206, at 517–21 (discussing the modern, more nuanced 
approach to comparative negligence in intentional torts). 
 195 DOBBS, supra note 102, § 229, at 582–83 (discussing the factors taken into account 
in determining the defendant’s duty); id. § 202, at 506–07 (discussing comparative fault); 
see also 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 181, § 1:4, at 14–16 (discussing fault in tort law as 
responsive to changes in social conditions); Schwartz, supra note 189, at 1815–19 (1997) 
(arguing that corrective justice—with its focus on relational fairness and not just economic-
based deterrence rationales—underlies negligence-based torts). 
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benefit from the adoption of internal anti-discrimination policies and the 
assignment of responsibility to employees for implementing them.  
Taking this one step further, the employer’s adoption of an anti-
discrimination policy should be viewed as an affirmative undertaking by the 
defendant, with reliance by the plaintiff, giving rise to a duty on the defendant 
to take reasonable care.196 Tort law places a duty of reasonable care on a 
person who need not, in the first instance, take measures to avoid harm, but 
voluntarily assumes a duty to do so.197 Likewise, while an employer need not 
promise anti-discrimination protection beyond what is required by Title VII, 
having done so, it should have a duty of care not to punish persons who use 
the employer’s policies to report discrimination. Similarly, having created 
anti-discrimination policies and charged certain employees to oversee and 
administer them, the employer should be viewed as assuming a duty not to 
retaliate against them for doing so. The employer’s punishment of employees 
for following or administering internal anti-discrimination policies that the 
employer affirmatively adopted should be viewed as a breach of that duty. 
The above arguments for using intentional tort and negligence concepts to 
direct attention to employer fault and strengthen retaliation protections rest on 
the assertion that employers benefit from having anti-discrimination policies 
and procedures in place. The following section briefly sketches those benefits 
and considers their implications for Title VII retaliation law more broadly. 
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF EMPLOYER NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 
INTO TITLE VII’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR A 
FAULT-BASED APPROACH TO RETALIATION 
Whether intentional torts or negligence ultimately sticks as the guiding 
analogy for the retaliation claim, the wrongfulness of retaliating against an 
employee for using internal complaint channels cannot be fully appreciated 
without understanding the outsized role these policies play in Title VII law and 
the benefits employers gain from adopting them. Over the past two decades, 
employment discrimination law has increasingly incentivized—both formally 
and informally—the adoption of internal anti-discrimination policies and 
complaint procedures. The most well known of these stem from the employer 
liability rules for supervisor sexual harassment, which the Supreme Court 
announced in a pair of cases decided in 1998.198 That framework imposes 
vicarious liability on employers for sexual harassment by a supervisor, subject 
to an affirmative defense. The affirmative defense makes the existence of 
internal policies and procedures for addressing sexual harassment a virtual 
                                                                                                                     
 196 See DOBBS, supra note 102, § 319, at 860–64. 
 197 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 42 (2010). 
 198 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
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necessity in order to avoid liability in such cases.199 This same liability 
framework, and resulting incentives for adopting internal policies, applies to 
other forms of unlawful harassment too, including harassment based on race, 
religion, or national origin. Employer liability rules for harassment by non-
supervisors (co-workers or customers), while not governed by the affirmative 
defense per se, also incentivize internal policies and grievance procedures. The 
fault-based “knew or should have known” standard courts apply to non-
supervisory workplace harassment is more easily established if the employer 
lacked a viable policy for reporting harassment.200 
The employer liability rules for harassment are only the beginning of the 
legal incentives for employers to adopt internal policies and procedures 
addressing discrimination. In all discrimination cases, employers benefit from 
having anti-discrimination policies. Even if the plaintiff proves discrimination 
in court, having such a policy can inoculate the employer against a punitive 
damages award.201 Apart from damages, socio-legal scholars have found that 
anti-discrimination policies significantly influence whether legal actors view 
employers as compliant with the law. In practice, the EEOC is less likely to 
find “cause” to believe that discrimination occurred if the employer had an 
anti-discrimination policy.202 Such policies convey the impression of a well-
meaning employer, one with a visible commitment to non-discrimination 
rather than one that acts with a discriminatory intent.203 Judges, too, look more 
favorably on employers with anti-discrimination policies and tend to equate 
having such policies with legal compliance.204 
If the Court’s musings in Staub are any indication, the value of anti-
discrimination policies to employers may further appreciate. In discussing the 
role of proximate cause in a cat’s paw scenario, the Court left open the 
possibility that a truly independent internal investigation might exonerate the 
defendant from liability for a subordinate’s discriminatory action. The Court 
suggested that it might break the chain of proximate cause if the plaintiff failed 
to use an available internal channel to complain about the allegedly 
                                                                                                                     
 199 See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 25, at 391 (summarizing case law and stating, 
“[a]lthough the Supreme Court has stated that an employer need not necessarily have 
promulgated an antiharassment policy to satisfy its duty of reasonable care, it is unusual for 
an employer to prevail absent such a policy”). 
 200 See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2463–64 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 2453 (majority opinion) (“Assuming that a harasser is not a 
supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her employer was negligent 
in failing to prevent harassment from taking place.”). 
 201 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544–46 (1999). 
 202 C. Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of Discrimination: Workplace 
Conditions, Institutional Environments, and Sex and Race Discrimination Charges, 113 
AM. J. SOC. 1394, 1424–25 (2008). 
 203 See C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organizational Determinants of 
Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239, 250–51 (2008). 
 204 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to 
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 906, 929–30 (2011). 
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discriminatory action.205 If this dictum comes to fruition, internal anti-
discrimination policies will have the added benefit of limiting employer 
liability for adverse actions induced by a subordinate employee acting upon a 
discriminatory motivation. 
Given the role internal anti-discrimination policies play in Title VII’s legal 
landscape, the bifurcation of internal and external complaint channels—with 
their different levels of protection—should be revisited.206 Short of such a 
stark change in retaliation doctrine, however, the determination of protected 
activity under the opposition clause should at least take into account the 
employer’s role in enticing and even requiring employees to use employer 
channels for addressing discrimination. 
The wrongfulness of an employer profiting from the adoption of an anti-
discrimination policy and complaint procedure, and then turning around and 
retaliating against employees for participating in them, was not lost on the 
Supreme Court when it addressed a distinct issue of retaliation law in 
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County.207 In 
that case, the employer allegedly retaliated against an employee for 
participating as a corroborating witness in an internal investigation of a sexual 
harassment complaint brought by a co-worker.208 The lower court had ruled 
that the plaintiff’s participation as a witness in an internal investigation 
pursuant to the employer’s anti-harassment policy did not qualify as 
opposition to discrimination, and therefore was not protected activity under 
Title VII.209 The Supreme Court reversed and emphatically rejected the 
employer’s argument that permitting retaliation claims by witnesses in internal 
investigations would deter employers from undertaking such voluntary 
compliance efforts.210 The Court’s rejoinder emphasized how deeply Title VII 
liability rules have incentivized internal anti-discrimination policies and 
grievance procedures, and how commonplace such policies are in the 
workplace.211 Calling the rule proposed by the employer “freakish,” the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 205 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 n.4 (2011) (“We also observe that 
Staub took advantage of Proctor’s grievance process, and we express no view as to whether 
Proctor would have an affirmative defense if he did not.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 
47, at 1434 & n.9 (suggesting that Staub will likely increase the role of employers’ anti-
discrimination policies and complaint procedures). 
 206 Orly Lobel, Remarks in New Ways of Governing the Workplace: Proceedings of 
the 2007 Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations 
and Employment Law (transcript in 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 111, 113–19) (arguing 
against the current default in workplace law of providing greater protection for employee 
exercises of external voice than internal voice). 
 207 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 279 
(2009). 
 208 Id. at 273–74. 
 209 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 211 Fed. App’x 373, 
376–77 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 210 Crawford, 555 U.S. at 278. 
 211 Id. at 278–79. 
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exhibited sensitivity to the unfairness of a legal framework that would reward 
employers for adopting anti-discrimination policies but allow them to retaliate 
against the employees who participate in them.212 While the Court’s holding in 
Crawford is a narrow one, ruling that witness participation in internal 
grievance procedures may qualify as protected “opposition” to discrimination, 
the Court’s opinion lays the building blocks for a broader view of employer 
wrongfulness in the retaliation claim. The tension the Court noted in Crawford 
is palpable in the case law discussed above, in which lower courts have 
enabled employers to punish employees for following internal anti-
discrimination policies to report discrimination, and for administering these 
policies and complaint procedures, by crafting tort-inspired limits on what 
counts as protected activity. 
Another recent Supreme Court retaliation case offers further hope for 
developing conceptions of employer wrongfulness broad enough to resist the 
tort-inspired limits on Title VII retaliation claims discussed above, particularly 
the manager rule. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,213 the Court 
construed the class of persons to whom the employer owes a duty not to 
retaliate to include persons other than the complainant.214 In that case the 
Court ruled that retaliating against the complainant’s fiancé was actionable 
under Title VII, and that the fiancé himself, as a “person aggrieved,” could sue 
for the retaliation.215 The Court was not tempted to construct a proximate 
cause-type roadblock limiting the employer’s liability to only those retaliatory 
actions taken against a complainant.216 The wrongfulness of the employer’s 
conduct supported the Court’s broad, purpose-driven approach to statutory 
interpretation in that case. The Thompson holding does not sweep so far as to 
call into question the manager rule cases; the Court limited its reasoning to 
persons in a “close relationship” with the complainant.217 However, to the 
extent the wrongfulness of the employer’s actions drove the Court’s result, the 
reasoning suggests that the Court may be receptive to arguments about 
employer wrongfulness in targeting EEO personnel, who are not themselves 
complainants, but who are subjected to discrimination for investigating and 
addressing other employees’ discrimination complaints pursuant to employer 
policies. 
Both Crawford and Thompson show the Supreme Court to be alert to the 
potential for employer wrongdoing and on guard against interpretations of 
Title VII that would invite it. In addition, Nassar forthrightly invokes an 
analogy to torts as a fitting lens for construing the retaliation claim, repeatedly 
describing the claim as one for remedying employer wrongdoing. Together, 
these cases open the door to the potential for using tort principles as an 
                                                                                                                     
 212 Id. at 278. 
 213 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 214 Id. at 867–68. 
 215 Id. at 870. 
 216 Id. at 868–69. 
 217 Id. 
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interpretive guide to nudge Title VII closer to capturing wrongful retaliation. 
Title VII’s wholesale embrace of employer non-discrimination policies is a big 
part of what makes employer retaliation so wrongful under the opposition 
clause. Shifting the tort lens to hone in on employer fault is a productive way 
to push back against the one-way use of tort principles that has so far taken 
hold in the lower courts to limit employer liability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
After the Court’s packaging of retaliation as a tort in Nassar, any agenda 
to keep tort law out of Title VII retaliation law has already been lost. Even if 
the explicit importation of tort principles in this area could be halted, it would 
not prevent the surreptitious influence of tort-inspired limits on retaliation 
claims. Without naming tort law as the foundation for the reasonable belief 
doctrine and the manager rule, lower court decisions applying these doctrines 
bear the footprints of torts.218 In these cases, the pull of at-will employment 
and the presumption—reflected in Nassar—that employers generally act for 
legitimate reasons has been driving courts’ turn to torts.219 Tort law may be 
here to stay, but there is room to resist its selective and one-way use to cut 
short employer liability. A more faithful use of tort principles would 
reinvigorate the concept of employer wrongfulness as the touchstone for the 
retaliation claim—a focus that has been lost in the lower court’s piecemeal 
approach to tort-inspired principles. 
This Article has argued that a big part of what makes the employer’s 
conduct wrongful in retaliation cases bought under the opposition clause is 
that employers are benefitting from having anti-discrimination policies while 
punishing employees for using and implementing them. Like a tort, this 
wrongfulness exists apart from any contractual obligation not to retaliate for 
the use or implementation of these processes. Indeed, well-crafted anti-
discrimination policies avoid creating such contractual rights for employees 
                                                                                                                     
 218 Cf. William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to 
Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 454–56 (2013) 
(arguing that, although courts have not explicitly invoked the tort doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur in Title VII cases, that is effectively what they have done in adopting the pretext 
proof method). 
 219 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531–32 (2013). The 
Court’s concern, that a more lenient standard for proving causation-in-fact would result in 
excessive liability and invite frivolous claims, might have been exacerbated by retaliation 
law’s allowance of proximity in time to infer proof of causation. To borrow an analogy 
from Bill Corbett, proximity is the res ipsa loquitur of retaliation: the closeness in time 
between the protected activity and the adverse actions speaks for itself, creating an 
inference of retaliatory intent. Corbett, supra note 218, at 486–91 (arguing that the 
McDonnell Douglas proof structure is a de facto res ipsa loquitur rule). Judicial anxiety 
about inferring causation from proximity may be driving courts to set limits on protected 
activity in order to keep the retaliation claim in check. 
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that would give rise to a breach of contract action.220 Whether or not the 
employer made a legally binding promise not to retaliate, the core wrong 
stems from the violation of the social policy codified in Title VII. In addition 
to impeding the enforcement of statutory rights, there is the added wrong of 
employers inducing employees to address discrimination internally, within a 
legal framework that rewards employers for having anti-discrimination 
policies, while punishing employees for following or executing those very 
policies. Tort principles should be redirected to capture this core of 
wrongfulness at the heart of the retaliation claim. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 220 See Slater, supra note 43, at 98 (noting that the creation of contract rights by such 
policies can be avoided by the inclusion of appropriate disclaimers). 
